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Between 1950 and 2017, world average life-expectancy increased frombelow-50 to above-
70, while the fertility rate dropped from 5 to about 2.5 children per woman (Figure 1).
The worldwide rise of life-expectancy and fall of total fertility rate is expected to ro-
bustly continue for the remainder of the current century, with the emerging economies
catching up the patterns typical for economies that industrialized before. Fenichel et al.
(2017) study the effect of global demographic changes on individual utility discount
rates, and through these, on efficient climate policies. We consider an indirect effect
of global demographic change on climate policies, that is, through labour and capital
markets. The worldwide demographic trends decreases the ratio of young relative to
old and change the propensity to save of the average consumer. Both supply of labour
and capital will adjust, and future capital returns will most likely differ from those in
the past.
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Note: The year 2017 is indicated with a vertical line. Source: United Nations. World Population
Prospects. Medium-variant projections. The projections do not take into account projected climate
change, but the expected effect is small compared to other major drivers of demographic change.
Climate policies search the optimal trade-off between consumption, investments in
man-made capital, and investment in natural capital through emissions reductions
(Nordhaus, 1993). How should climate policies adjust in response to global demo-
graphic change? Using a stylized overlapping generations model (based on Fanti and
Gori (2012); Cipriani (2014)), we analytically and quantitatively analyze the effects of
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an increase in life-expectancy and a decrease in fertility rates on households’ savings,
aggregate capital investments, and efficient climate policies. For comparison we also
study demography and optimal climate policy in a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model (as
in Nordhaus (1993)).
The overlapping generations (OLG) model is the standard approach to study de-
mography’s effects on savings and investments. The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans (RCK)
model, with an infinitely-lived representative agent, is themost common type of model
to study climate policy in the context of economic growth. We compare the effects of
demography on climate policy in both types of models. The OLG model suggests that
falling fertility and increasing life expectancy leads to a robust increase in future house-
holds savings. In turn, these lead to a substantial tightening of present efficient climate
policies, that is, a large increase in the (present) efficient carbon price.1 The reason
that future capital markets have such robust effects for present climate policies comes
from the extreme persistence of climate change (Gerlagh and Liski, 2017b). Chen and
Wen (2017) argue that "rational expectations of a strong future demand for alternative
stores of value induce current [investments]", and conclude that this mechanism ex-
plains high housing prices in China, sharply rising. In a similar vein, we argue that
a stable climate system is a very durable store of value for the future global economy,
explaining high optimal carbon prices, rising faster than the economy. The same de-
mographic patterns, in the RCK model, result in a decrease in both the future savings
rate and the present carbon price. We show that the OLG and RCK types of model thus
provide radically different outcomes. Therefore, we call for a closer look at previous
quantitative estimates for the social costs of carbon (SCC), which mostly neglected the
effects of demographic patterns on capital markets and climate policies.
The intuition for our main results, derived with the OLG model, is straightforward.
The twoworldwide demographic trends, increasing life expectancy and decreasing fer-
tility, both increase household savings. First, since people expect to live longer, they re-
quire more resources when old after they leave the labour market.2 Second, a decrease
in the fertility rate causes an increase in labor supply when young, and thus, a rise in
income, which is partly saved to smooth consumption over the life-cycle. As capital
stocks increase, the returns fall, and it becomes relatively more attractive to invest in
1In this paper, we use the terms (efficient) carbon price and the social costs of carbon (SCC) interchange-
ably. They refer to the net present value of damages associated with one extra unit of CO2 emissions.
2OurOLGmodel base set up is a fully funded pension system. We do not examine the effects of changes




Our analytical model presents an analytic formula for the social cost of carbon, con-
necting to a large literature. A large literature on the social costs of carbon is devoted to
the question of the discount rate by which future climate damages are discounted be-
fore aggregation in the Net Present Value (Weitzman, 2013).3 Both the so-called ’pure’
discount rate for utility streams and the discount rate for consumption goods feature
prominently in this literature. Recently, van den Bijgaart et al. (2016) presented an al-
ternative discount rate measure. They show that the relative value of future output
compared to present output, bt = Yt+1rt+1Yt (labeled the effective discount factor), where
Yt is output and rt+1 is the marginal rate of substitution between the two periods, cap-
tures themost important discount information required to calculate the efficient carbon
price.4 We use the effective discount factor to gauge the implications of our approach
for the SCC.
Table 1 reports the values of the key parameters and the implied effective annual
discount factors bt used in previous studies. Before reading the table, we note that
in most models, the effective discount factor varies with demography. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first paper that makes this connection explicit. The previ-
ous studies reported in Table 1 rely on the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans (RCK) model, in
which the Ramsey rule, rt = β−1m1−ξt γ
η
t , connects the marginal rate of substitution, rt,
to the pure time preference factor β,5 population growth mt, where ξ ∈ {0, 1} is the
population weight in the social planner problem,6 the elasticity of marginal utility η
and the per capita growth factor of consumption γt. The effective discount factor bt
then also depends on the scale of the economy through both population growth mt
and productivity growth, which approximately also measures per capita consumption
growth, Yt+1/Yt ≈ mtγt, so that bt ≈ mtγt/rt = βmξtγ
1−η
t .7
3See Guo et al. (2006) for an analysis of the consequences of declining discount rates on estimates of the
social cost of carbon. See also Karp and Traeger (2013) and Weitzman (2013) for a discussion about
discounting in cost-benefit analysis andMastrandrea and Schneider (2001) for a better understanding
of the effects of relatively low discount rates on climate policies. van den Bergh and Botzen (2015)
present a recent survey of this literature.
4See eq (18) in this paper.
5We can switch between rates and factors, through β = 1/(1 + ρ) where ρ is the pure time preference
rate.
6For Benthamite welfare weighing utility by population size, ξ = 1 and the rate of substitution only
depends on per capita consumption growth. For Millian welfare aggregating average utility, ξ = 0
and the rate of substitution increases with population growth. See Canton and Meijdam (1997) for
more details.
7We use an approximate sign because equality requires that the consumption share is constant, which
is approximately correct.
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Asnoted in the literature, the effective discount factor is sensitive to parameter setting
procedures. For instance, whereas Stern (2007), following an ethics-based approach,
chooses a rate of pure time preference of 0.1% per year, Nordhaus (2008), Nordhaus
(2014) and Golosov et al. (2014), using a market-based approach, set a rate of 1.5%.
Higher values for this parameter can be found inWeitzman (2007) andNordhaus (1993)
(first column entries of Table 1). Importantly, comparing the columns bt for 2010 and
2100, we see that because population growth,mt, is expected to decrease in the coming
century, in the standard RCKmodel, the implied effective discount factor, bt, decreases
as well. In contrast, in the OLG model, the effective annual discount factor bt does not
depend onpopulation growth directly as in the RCKmodel, but only indirectly through
its effects on life-cycle savings. The effective discount factor varies with demographic
factors, most importantly life-expectancy, through changes in demand for capital as a
retirement investment. To relate our results to the existing literature, we calibrate the
model parameters such that the (time-varying) effective annual discount factor at 2010
equals the constant discount factor b = 0.985 used in Golosov et al. (2014). As the table
shows, we find the effective discount factor to increase over the next century, rather
than to decrease.
Table 1: Effective annual discount factors and social costs of carbon
β η ξ
bt SCCt
2010 2100 2010 2100
Nordhaus (1993) 0.970 1 1 0.982 0.971 14.2 110
Weitzman (2007) 0.980 2 1 0.974 0.962 10.7 84.1
Stern (2007) 0.999 1 1 1.011 1.000 - -
Nordhaus (2008) 0.985 2 1 0.979 0.967 12.5 96.3
Nordhaus (2014) 0.985 1.45 1 0.989 0.978 18.7 140
Golosov et al. (2014) 0.985 1 0 0.985 0.985 21.2 206
This paper n.a. 1 n.a 0.985 0.996 63.8 794
Note: β: the discount factor for utility between generations. Its value is exogenous
in Ramsey-Cass-Koopmansmodels, and endogenous in our model. η: the elastic-
ity of marginal utility (the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution).
ξ: indicator parameter for weighting utility. bt ≈ βmξtγ
1−η
t : the effective discount
factor. For per capita consumption growthwe use γ = 1.019 for 2010 and γ = 1.02
for 2100. For population growth, we use m = 1.012 for 2010 and m = 1.001 for
2100. SCCt: The social costs of carbon [EUR/tCO2] tends to increase with bt and
with income, see eq (18), and Appendix C for the quantitative calculation of bt.
The quantitative effects on the social costs of carbon, of these divergent patterns for
the discount factor, are shown in the last two columns of Table 1. For instance, at our
calibration year 2010, a model that features no demographics as described in Golosov
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et al. (2014) yields a carbon price 67% lower than the one related to our benchmark
model. This difference is even higher when our OLGmodel is comparedwith the other
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmansmodels that impose a negative effect of decreasing population
growth rates on optimal savings.
2. Further literature
Our paper relates to three strands of literature.8 Firstly, there are a few numerical Inte-
gratedAssessmentModels (IAMs) that study climate policies in an economywith over-
lapping generations (OLG). Howarth (1998) and Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2001) are
the closest to this paper. Recently, Quaas and Bröcker (2016) developed an analytical
OLG-climate model.9 We extend these papers by providing a rich set of analytic results
that characterize formally the effect of demography on climate policies. We add a for-
mal analysis of demography in the (competing) Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans (RCK) model
type. Furthermore, we set up a calibration procedure that quantifies the effects through
a transparent approach, as compared to the quantitative IAMswithmanymoving parts
in which causality is hard to gauge.
Secondly, we relate to recent economic research suggesting that demographic pat-
terns over the last decades have increased aggregate household savings rates and de-
creased the capital returns, mainly through shifts in the age structure of the popula-
tion (Canton and Meijdam, 1997; Bloom et al., 2003, 2007; Eggertsson and Mehrotra,
2014; Curtis et al., 2015; Carvalho et al., 2016; Imrohoroglu and Zhao, 2017). Demogra-
phy also drives part of international trade and capital flows, which reflect discrepan-
cies between savings and investments across countries (Backus et al., 2014; Fedotenkov
et al., 2014; Krueger and Ludwig, 2007). Demographic change has been connected to
housing prices, since lower returns to capital in the future create incentives for seeking
8Notice that in our modelling, demographic variables are exogenous and temperature changes only
affect production. Several studies assess the effect of population aging on emissions and the envi-
ronment, see Balestra and Dottori (2012), Jouvet et al. (2010), Varvarigos (2010), Mariani et al. (2010),
and Ono (2005). De la Croix and Gosseries (2012) study the effect of climate policies on fertility and
human capital. In a similar vein, with respect to the relationship between carbon emissions and pop-
ulation, Casey and Galor (2017) provide empirical evidence that a reduction in fertility rates, while
increases income per capita, diminishes carbon emissions. Likewise, Dalton et al. (2008) provides an
analysis of the effect of population aging on U.S energy use and carbon emissions. None of these
studies point to the impact of demographic patterns on savings rates and, subsequently, on climate
policies.
9Karp and Rezai (2014) use an OLG model for a somewhat different purpose. They show that if the
environmental benefits of climate policies can be capitalized in an increased value of the capital stock,
current generations also benefit from environmental policies.
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alternative stores of value (Chen and Wen, 2017), and changes in social security sys-
tems due to population aging (Imrohoroglu and Zhao, 2017; Cipriani, 2014; Fanti and
Gori, 2012). Curtis et al. (2015) show that demographic patterns are able to explain
over half of the household savings rate fluctuations in China, while Sánchez-Romero
(2013) finds that the demographic transition in Taiwan, during the period 1965-2005,
substantially increased the investment rate, leading to more capital and higher GDP
per capita growth.10 Going forward, while our model formulation can reproduce the
results mentioned above, we add to this literature the impact of changing savings, due
to population dynamics, on the evaluation of expected future environmental damages
and climate policies.
Thirdly, our theoretical framework also builds on an emerging analytical literature
about optimal carbon taxes as dependent on a few parameters: pure time preferences,
a carbon cycle structure, temperature adjustments, and expected damages due to cli-
mate change (Golosov et al., 2014).11 Others have added risk updating when climate
information arrives (Gerlagh and Liski, 2017a), temperature delays and general time
preferences (Gerlagh and Liski, 2017b),12 and tax distortions (Barrage, 2016). We add
demographic parameters to these.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3 presents the benchmark
model and describes the equilibrium concept. Section 4 discusses existence issues and
provides a comparative statics analysis. Section 5 introduces the RCK model with de-
mography and outlines optimal climate policies. Section 6 includes a quantitative as-
sessment and discusses parameter calibration, data, and the climate module, to calcu-
late the social cost of carbon. Section 7 concludes.
3. The model
We consider a two-period OLG model with full depreciation and log utility based on
Cipriani (2014) and Fanti and Gori (2012) to analyze the impact of changes in fertility
and life-expectancy on savings and, therefore, through the aggregate capital market,
the effect of the demographic transition on environmental policies. Time is discrete
10It is important to mention that we model a closed economy and therefore the aggregate savings rate
equals the investment rate.
11For a discussion of the implications and robustness of simple carbon pricing rules see e.g., Barrage
(2014), van den Bijgaart et al. (2016), and Rezai and van der Ploeg (2015).
12See also Iverson and Karp (2017); Belfiori (2013) for discussions on time preferences and the SCC
formula.
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and runs to infinity. The economy’s technology is based on Gerlagh and Liski (2017b),
while our quantitative assessment employs the (median) climate-damage description
listed in van den Bijgaart et al. (2016).
3.1. Households
Each agent lives with certainty during the first period, and faces a probability ht of sur-
viving to the second period. Individuals work when young and consume their savings
when old. Consumption by children is not explicitlymodeled, but the time that parents
spend raising their children, χnt < 1, where nt is the number of children and χ is the
time per child, is deducted from labour supply. That is, the size of each generation is
denoted byNt, withNt+1 = ntNt, andMt = Nt + ht−1Nt−1 is the total population. Only
the young generation works, and the labour supply is inelastic, given by
Lt = (1− χnt)Nt. (1)
The household chooses consumption and savings to maximize life-time utility,
max
{c1,t,c2,t+1,st}
ut = u1,t + δhtu2,t+1, (2)
where u1,t = ln(c1,t), u2,t = ln(c2,t+1), subject to the budget constraints when young and
old,
c1,t + st + χwtnt = wt + τt, (3)
htc2,t+1 = rt+1st, (4)
where c1,t and c2,t+1 denote consumption at young and old age (when living); st are
savings, δ ∈ (0, 1) refers to the discount factor; ht ∈ (0, 1) is the probability of surviving
(longevity) which varies exogenously over time, so that htc2,t+1 is expected consump-
tion when old. The variable rt+1 is the return to savings; wt represents the wage that
individual receives for supplying inelastically one unit of labour; τt is the per capita
government lump-sum transfer (recycling of carbon tax revenues, discussed below), nt
is the exogenous fertility rate and χ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the fraction of time that it is needed
for raising children. Note that we study the effects of (exogenous) demography on cli-
mate policies. By considering endogenous fertility and health choices, as in Becker and
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Lewis (1973), the analysis can be extended to describe demographic policies as part of
climate change policies (Harford, 1998; Murtaugh and Schlax, 2009; Bohn and Stuart,
2015).13




Using the Euler equation and the budget constraints (3,4), the savings of households




(wt(1− χnt) + τt). (6)
For analysis, we assume that demography converges to some long-term trend.
Assumption 1. Fertility and life-expectancy converge to long-term values: nt → n∞ > 0,
ht → h∞ ≤ 1.
3.2. Production and Climate
Following Gerlagh and Liski (2017b), we model the economy’s technology, which is a
function of capital, labour, fossil fuel energy, and the past emissions, in the following
way:
Yt = F (Kt, Et, Lt; zt), (7)
with constant returns to scale in capitalKt , labourLt , and emissionsEt (proximated by
use of fossil fuel energy sources), and zt = (Et−1, Et−2, . . . ) is the history of emissions.
Production has constant elasticity in capital, and climate change damages are described
through a multiplicative factor,




with α ∈ (0, 1), and Ω(zt) refers to output loss due to past emissions. At(Et, Lt) has
constant returns to scale, and is time dependent, accounting for effective energy-labour
combination. When convenient, we write at ≡ At/Lt as labour-augmenting productiv-
ity, which only depends on per labour emissions, at = at(et), with et ≡ Et/Lt. One can
13These papers do not look at the effect of demography on climate policies through capital markets.
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where yt ≡ Yt/Lt and kt ≡ Kt/Lt are output- and capital-labour ratios, respectively.
Assumption 2. Effective labour productivity at(et) is continously differentiable, increasing in
emissions per labourer, strictly concave, emissions are not essential and become zero for a finite
carbon price, a′t > 0 and a′′t < 0 for et < emaxt , for some emaxt > 0; a′t(emaxt ) = 0, at(0) > 0,
a′t(0) <∞.
We keep a general climate impact structure. Golosov et al. (2014) relate climate im-
pacts to atmospheric CO2 stocks, while Gerlagh and Liski (2017a) provide an in-depth






where θi can be interpreted as a representation of the carbon cycle and temperature
adjustments (see van den Bijgaart et al. (2016)).
Each period, a representative firm uses capitalK, labour L and energy E to produce
a final good using a Cobb-Douglas technology and solves the following problem:
max
{Kt,Lt,Et}
F (Kt, Et, Lt; zt)− rtKt − wtLt − ptEt, (11)
where pt refers to the carbon emissions price, and the firm considers Ωt as exogenous.













where AX,t is the derivative of At with respect to Xt. We have that labour income plus
government transfers are a constant share of output,
wtLt + ptEt = (1− α)Yt.
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3.3. Carbon policies
The carbon regulator can set carbon taxes pt, and lump-sum income transfers τt. The
regulator is subject to an intertemporal budget condition: the net present value of car-











where rt+it is the capital return between period t and t + i, rt+i+1t ≡ rt+it rt+i+1. As a
central case, detailed in the next section, we consider equilibria where the government
budget balances within each period,
Ntτt = ptEt. (16)
In Section 4.1 we derive equilibrium rules for carbon pricing pt. Here, we define the
























where bt+it is the net present value of future output, at t + i, relative to current output,







Formula (18) for the carbonprice is similar to carbonprice formulas presented inGolosov
et al. (2014), van den Bijgaart et al. (2016), and Gerlagh and Liski (2017b). The carbon
price tends to increase proportionally with output as a larger economy values emis-
sions more. In a larger economy, there is more at stake as damages also scale with
the economy. Thus, an increase in labour supply, complemented with a proportional
increase in capital, will tend to raise output, and the carbon price alongside. If we la-
bel the summation term on the RHS of (18) as gt, then it reads MCCt = gtYt. In the
expression, gt depends on the value of future output, but we will provide conditions
11
when gt becomes a constant, that is, independent of the current capital stock or future
policies. Conditional on Assumption 2, and given capital and labour factor supply, the
next lemma establishes a unique static equilibrium in case gtYt is implemented as the
carbon price.





In this economy, emissions versus output tend to follow a so-called Environmental
Kuznets curve. For low output levels (low levels of factor supply), carbon prices are
negligible and emissions increase approximately proportional with factor supply and
output. For high output (factor supply), the term AE,t(0,Lt)
At(0,Lt)
falls below gt, and emissions
become zero.
Below, we will establish closed-form solutions for bt, and conditions under which
optimal carbon prices equal the market valuation of carbon, p∗t = MCCt.14 Novel in
our analysis is that we study how the discount factor bt+it varies with time as a re-
sult of demographic change. Therefore, optimal climate policies adjust to demographic
changes as well; (18) becomes demography-dependent. We then compare our solution
for the carbon price with a closed-form solution for a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model
with Benthamite welfare as in Nordhaus (2008) and most other Integrated Assessment
Models, and with Millian welfare as in Golosov et al. (2014).
3.4. Equilibrium
In equilibrium, aggregate consumption plus investments equal production,
Ntc1,t + ht−1Nt−1c2,t +Kt+1 = Yt. (20)
We can now define the competitive equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1. Given the parameter set {χ, δ, α, (θi)}, a competitive equilibrium is an alloca-
tion {c1,t, c2,t, st, Yt, Kt+1, Et, τt}∞t=1, supported by prices {rt, wt, pt}∞t=1 such that (i) households
maximize their life-time utility, (3-5), (ii) firms maximize profits, (12-14), (iii) the government
satisfies the inter-temporal balanced budget, (15), and (iv) the aggregate goods market clearing
condition holds, (20).
14We do not consider tax-interaction effects as in Barrage (2016).
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The definition leaves open how carbon prices are determined; it does not impose
carbon prices to reflect the social costs of carbon. Notice that the definition also does not
consider conditions about income transfers between generations. The first refinement
of the equilibrium concept specifies that the regulator does not transfer income between
generations. We define:
Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium is called ‘representative’ if the government satisfies
its budget constraint period-by-period, i.e. (16) holds.
The definition captures the idea that we want to study carbon taxes in isolation; we
want carbon policies to be free from a potential preference for redistributing wealth
across generations. The representative equilibrium defines what it means to exclude
redistributional preferences.15 Condition (16) determines the welfare weights, defined
shortly below. They depend on demography, but are the same in a representative equi-
librium with or without climate damages, and with or without climate policies.
This ’representative’ equilibrium is the OLG-equivalent of the infinitely-lived repre-
sentative agent approach in RCK models such as DICE (Nordhaus, 2008). The typical
RCK model chooses its social preference parameters such that, in absence of a climate
externality, the model reproduces realistic consumption smoothing and capital invest-
ment rates. Similarly, in our model, we calibrate preferences δ such that the competi-
tive equilibrium without intergenerational income transfers generates realistic macro-
economic savings rates.16,17
There is a connection between inter-generational income transfers τt, capital invest-
ments Kt+1 and the value ratio bt+1. We can rewrite the inter-temporal government
15Compare with an economy that has no climate externality, i.e. θ = (0, 0, ...). The representative laissez-
faire competitive equilibrium, τt = pt = 0, is then efficient and does not redistribute income.
16We could say that the regulator in our economy derives its implicit welfare weights, βt defined below,
from historic macro-economic savings. As we see below in equations (22) and (23), our model also
has an equivalent to ’low discounting’ in the RCK model. So-called ’low’ pure discount rates in
RCKmodels are often considered fair from an ethical perspective, but discarded as inconsistent with
revealed social preferences, because they would result in unrealistically high investment rates. In
our economy, the equivalent of ’low discounting’ is an equilibrium with positive income transfers
to future generations, Sgt > 0. Such transfers would result in artificial ’high’ investment rates at the
macro-economy level and higher implicit welfare weights for future generations.
17Technically, the representative equilibrium is similar to the use of Negishi welfare weights in a multi-
country model. As an example, the multi-region RICE model (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996) contains
an iterative algorithm to find welfare weights that are consistent with zero income transfers between
regions and equal weighted marginal utility. A consequence of the approach in RICE is that welfare
weights depend on climate policies and vary between scenarios.
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budget (15) through a public savings variable Sgt as
Sgt = rtS
g
t−1 + ptEt −Ntτt, (21)




1 = 0. Public savings remain zero,
Sgt = 0, if and only if the period-by-period balanced budget (16) holds. It is a matter of
straight verification that private plus public savings equal investments,
Kt+1 = Ntst + S
g
t . (22)





Equations (22) and (23) imply that theweight given to future output bt corresponds one-
to-onewith private plus public savings. A planner who attributes highwelfare weights
to future generations transfers income from present generations to future generations,
through positive public savings. The increased future capital stock also increases the
value of future output relative to current output. Inmost of our analysis, we close down
a preferential treatment of future generations by requiring a government balanced bud-
get (16). A positive carbon price pt > 0 can be used to address climate externalities in a
market equilibrium; imposing (16) rules out other income intervention objectives.
The next definition zooms in on optimal carbon policies.
Definition 3. A competitive equilibrium is called ‘optimal’ if carbon prices, pt, and lump-sum





for some welfare weights sequence βt, satisfying
∑∞
t=1 βtNt <∞.
The above definition does not impose restrictions to the welfare weights sequence.
Belowwewill see that in our economy, in a representative optimal equilibrium, welfare
weights βt depend on demography.18 We note that all optimal equilibria are Pareto-
efficient.19
18In a typical infinitely-lived representative-agent (Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans) model, we have βt = βt
for some exogenous β.




We prove existence for a representative equilibrium, and for the unique optimal rep-
resentative equilibrium. We can then study the properties, specifically the effect of
demography on carbon prices. The proofs are relegated to Appendix B. The propo-
sitions state both existence and properties for our OLG economy, which we compare
with those for the RCK model in the next section.
The first proposition shows how the investment share varies with demography. We
note that individual savings depend on both aging and fertility (eq (6)), but at the ag-
gregate level, the savings rate only depends on life-expectancy.
Proposition 1. For any carbon pricing rule pt = gtYt, for given sequence gt ≥ 0, a unique
representative competitive equilibrium exists. The investment shares depend on demography,












Proof. In appendix B. 
The representative equilibrium, as such, does not require efficient carbon policies;
there is no match between the carbon price and the social costs of carbon. Below, we
will study efficient policies in a representative equilibrium. To ensure boundedwelfare
weights, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3. (Bounded net present value) Preference and production parameters satisfy
δht(1− α) < (1 + δht)α, for all t.
The second step is that we prove uniqueness of the optimal competitive equilibrium,
for given welfare weights, and we show that in such an equilibrium the market costs of
carbon and social costs of carbon coincide.
sense, e.g. when βt = 1, so that the weight series sum to infinity and welfare is not defined.
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Proposition 2. For any weight sequence βt such that
∑∞
t=1 βtNt <∞, a unique optimal com-
petitive equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, the carbon price equals the market costs of car-
















Proof. In appendix B. 
We have now shown existence of a unique representative equilibrium given a car-
bon pricing rule (Prop 1), and existence of a unique optimal equilibrium given welfare
weights (Prop 2). The next proposition connects the two, proving existence of a unique
optimal representative equilibrium.
Proposition 3. A unique optimal representative competitive equilibrium exists, with welfare

















Proof. In appendix B. 
Theproposition reveals various important features of the optimal representative equi-
librium. Theweights given to future generations increasewith an aging population, not
because aging increases the population size per se, but because aging changes the sav-
ings decisions, and thereby changes the weights given to future output (Prop 1), and
indirectly the weights given to future consumption. Welfare weights do not depend on
the climate characteristics, that is, welfare weights are independent of climate policies
and can be taken as input.20 That is, a laissez-faire equilibrium with no carbon prices,
20This is different from the RICE model; see also footnote 17.
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pt = 0, and no income transfers τt = 0, implements the same implicit welfare weights
as the optimal representative carbon policy of Prop 3.
4.2. Comparative demography
Herewe consider, for given technologiesAt(.) andΩ(.) andpreferencesu(.), how changes
in demographic parameters nt and ht affect equilibrium outcomes. Fertility is a deter-
minant of future labour supply, and as such, of economic growth. Aging determines
savings, and as such also affects future carbon prices. The next corollaries establish the
effect of demography on output.
But before we study demographic change, the next corollary establishes the bench-
mark case; Golosov et al. (2014)’s result is replicated if we shut down demographic
change:
Corollary 1. Without demographic change, nt = 1, ht = h, optimal representative carbon






for constant β = δh(1−α)
(1+δh)α








Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 3, equations (29) and (30). 
Then we establish two results of demography for capital and output, along the lines
of Canton and Meijdam (1997). These corollaries follow from Proposition 1.
Corollary 2. In a representative equilibrium, aging (keeping fertility unchanged) increases the
future capital stock, increases output, and decreases the return to investments.









Proof. In appendix B. 
Corollary 3. In a representative equilibrium, decreasing fertility (keeping life-expectancy un-







Proof. In appendix B. 
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The above two corollaries capture the spirit of the empirical literature, which sug-
gests that both increasing life-expectancy and decreasing fertility over the last decades
have increased aggregate household savings rates and decreased the capital returns
(Imrohoroglu and Zhao, 2017; Carvalho et al., 2016; Curtis et al., 2015; Eggertsson and
Mehrotra, 2014; Bloom et al., 2007, 2003; Curtis et al., 2015; Sánchez-Romero, 2013). The
last corollary remains silent on the effect of fertility on output, and the long run. An
increased labour supply compensates for the decrease in capital so that the immediate
output effect is ambiguous. For the long run effects, we note that emissions can either
rise or fall with changing labour supply. Thus, future productionmay increase through
increased labour supply, but it can also decrease through climate damages.
The next corollaries take the model to the domain of climate policies. The effect of
fertility is ambiguous, as in the previous corollary. But for life expectancy, we have
clear results. We compare a reference economy with a hypothetical alternative that
has the same history, the same technology, but some different demographic future. An
increase in current or future life-expectancy increases carbon prices by increasing the
value associated with future damages:
Corollary 4. In an optimal representative competitive equilibrium, present carbon prices in-
crease with present and future increases in life-expectancy
dpt
dht+k
> 0, ∀ k ≥ 0.
Proof. In appendix B. 
In addition to an increase in the present carbon price, an increased life-expectancy
also leads to a faster rise in carbon prices:
Corollary 5. Assume that life-expectancy is non-decreasing, ht ≤ ht+1, and has not reached its
long-term level at time t∗, ht∗ < h∞, then carbon prices in an optimal representative competitive







Proof. In appendix B. 
The general approach in the IAM literature is that parameters are calibrated on the
basis of historically observedmacro variables, and then themodel is used to project for-
wards output, investment and consumption paths. The above propositions show that
18
demographic change creates awedge between future projections andpast observations.
This result will, later on, be contrasted with the effect of demography on projections in
RCK models. We formalize the insights as a Remark, where we compare a model that
abstracts from demography to a model including demographic change.
Remark 1. Consider two economies with same technology and labour supply, calibrated to the
same historic observations (t = 0, 1) for economic growth and returns on capital, Y0, Y1, r1.
In the benchmark economy, life-expectancy is assumed stationary. In the extended economy
(denoted by a tilde), life expectancy is increasing, h̃t ≤ h̃t+1, and has not reached its long-term
level at time t∗, h̃t∗ < h̃∞. In both economies, preference parameter δ, δ̃ is calibrated such that
(25,26) hold in the calibrated period t = 0. Then optimal carbon prices are higher in the economy
with dynamic demography. For all t
p̃t > pt.
5. The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model
This section presents the standard neoclassical growth model with an climate mod-
ule to derive the conditions through which demography affects climate policies. We
assume a logarithmic utility function, full depreciation and an identical production
function as in the benchmark model. We also extend the analysis to the case where the
social planner can use either a Benthamite or a Millian utility as in Canton and Meij-
dam (1997). The Benthamite approach suggests to maximize social welfare by weight-
ing the utility function by the size of the dynastyMt, while the Millian approach uses
no weights. The parameter 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1 allows us to identity between those extreme
cases. To certain extent, we can relate the former case to the usual assumption in the
integrated assessment models ξ = 1 (see e.g., Nordhaus (2008)) and the latter to the
modeling in Golosov et al. (2014), which implies ξ = 0.
5.1. Households
A representative household derives utility from aggregate consumption Ct, while pop-





βtM ξt ln (Ct/Mt) , (31)
21In terms of the OLG model, we haveMt = Nt + ht−1Nt−1.
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subject to,
Ct + St ≤ rtSt−1 + wtLt +Mtτt, ∀t. (32)
The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) is the representative consumer’s discount factor, ξ = 0 refers
to a Millian (average) welfare function, while ξ = 1 refers to a Benthamite (aggregate)
welfare function, labor supply Lt is inelastic and typically proportional to total popu-
lation. Population growth is described throughMt+1 = mtMt.
The government sets carbon prices and income transfers that maximize the repre-
sentative household’s welfare function. It is immediately clear that the distribution of
income transfers over time has no effect on the consumption distribution by the house-
holds. For convenience, we consider the case where the government returns tax rev-
enues at the same period, (16), then savings equal capital, St = Kt and the equilibrium
equals the optimal solution to maximization of (31) subject to (7) and the commodity
balance,
Ct +Kt+1 = Yt.
5.2. Analysis
We first establish the general properties of the RCK model, both in terms of capital
investments and in terms of carbon policies.
Proposition 4. In the RCK model with dynamic populationMt, the investment share depends


























Proof. In appendix B. 
The OLG and RCK economies produce similar carbon price formulas if we neglect
demographic dynamics:
Corollary 6. For ξ = 0, or ξ > 0 without demographic change,Mt = M , optimal representa-











Proof. In appendix B. 
Nowwe consider the effects of demographic change. For the OLGmodel, we consid-
ered an increase in life-expectancy and fertility. The RCK model features population
size, which is derived from life-expectancy and fertility. We first consider the effect on
investments and output, which were established as the main factors determining the
carbon price:
Corollary 7. In the RCK economy with Benthamite welfare ξ = 1, population growth (assum-
ing the future population sizeMt is derived fromM1 and (m2, ...mt)) increases the future capital
stock and output,






Proof. In appendix B. 
The above corollary provides the intuition for the next one:




> 0 for i ≥ 0.
Proof. In appendix B. 
Evaluating the corollaries, and comparing these with their equivalent corollaries for
the OLG model (1,2,3,4,5), we see that both investments and carbon price dynamics
respond very differently to demographic change in the RCKmodel. Whereas the global
trends of increasing life-expectancy leads to rising savings and fast-rising carbon prices
in the OLG model, in the RCK model, the decrease in population growth leads to a
decrease in the investment share, and carbon prices that increase less then with output.
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Corollary 9. Assume ξ > 0 and population growth is non-increasing, mt ≥ mt+1, and has







Proof. In appendix B. 
Comparing the corollaries with their equivalent for the OLG economy, we find sharp
analytical results. Demography has opposite impacts on the paths of optimal carbon
prices, dependent on the model structure. In the OLG framework, a structural increase
in life-expectancy leads to higher carbon prices that grow faster than the economy. In
the RCKmodels the outcome depends on the welfare function. On the one hand, if we
apply Millian welfare (ξ = 0), carbon prices increase proportionally to output. On the
other hand, assuming a decreasing population growth and a weighted utility function
(the Benthamite case, ξ = 1), it turns out that carbon prices increase less than with
income.
The next remark presents the effect of demographic change on calculated optimal
climate policy.
Remark 2. Consider two economies with same technology and labour supply, calibrated to the
same historic observations (t = 0, 1) for economic growth and returns on capital, Y0, Y1, r1. In
the benchmark economy , population growth is assumed constant or absent, or welfare is Millian
(ξ = 0). In the extended economy (denoted by a tilde), population growth decreases, m̃t ≥ m̃t+1,
and has not reached its long-term level at t = t∗: m̃t∗ > m̃∞. In both economies, preference
parameter β, β̃ is calibrated such that (33) holds in the calibrated period t = 0. Then optimal
carbon prices are lower in the economy with dynamic demography. For all t ≤ t∗,
p̃t < pt.
Taking the two remarks together, we can now compare the effects of demographic
change in the OLG model versus the RCK model. Both models, when calibrated to
the same historic output levels and returns on capital, and when abstracting from de-
mography, will present the same optimal carbon prices. But results radically change
if both models are calibrated to the same future demographic change of increasing
life-expectancy, decreasing fertility, increasing population, and decreasing population
growth. Then both models, when used to project future trajectories, will produce con-
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trasting efficient carbon prices. The OLG economy will present high carbon prices
(comparatively), that increase faster than output. The RCK model will present lower
carbon prices, that increase at a rate below the growth of the economy. To assess the
quantitative substance of this analytical result, we add a numerical calibration in the
next section.
6. Quantitative assessment
In this section, we evaluate quantitatively carbon prices paths for the next hundred
years, using our benchmark OLG model and the RCK models, with and without pop-
ulation dynamics. A key characteristic of our assessment is that, though the model
is defined for periods that span many years, we set up our calibration and simulation
such that all variables are calculated on an annual basis. First, we specify the calibra-
tion of annual values for life expectancy ht, fertility nt and population size and growth
(Mt,mt). Then we describe the annual climate response function θi. These parameters,
and Golosov et al. (2014) as reference, are used to calibrate the preference parameter δ.
We subsequently calculate the welfare weights βt and output weights bt in our model,
both expressed as annualized variables. Welfare weights βt in the RCK model are ex-
ogenous, but we calculate the RCK models’ output weights bt, which depend on eco-
nomic growth if the elasticity of marginal utility is not equal to one. Finally, we bring
all the variables together to determine the social costs of carbon for the various models.
6.1. Demographics calibration
Our benchmark model considers 30 years per period, excluding childhood, so that life
time is maximally two periods. For low-income countries with low life-expectancy, we
assume that consumers enter the labour force at age 15, so that 1 + h = (LE − 15)/30,
whereLE is life-expectancy. For high-income countrieswith high longevity, we assume
that the average consumer starts working at age 20 as usual in previous literature, so
that 1 + h = (LE − 20)/30. Assuming a smooth transition between the low and high-
income countries, we calibrate our parameter ht through
ht = min{0.03LEt′ − 1.35, 1},
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which we calculate for each year t. In our model, ht refers to the life-expectancy of
the currently young, age 15, while our database measures life-expectancy at birth. To
match the model parameter with data, we define life-expectancy in our model at time
t through life-expectancy in the database at t′ = t − 15. We use the medium-variant
projection of world average data that come from the United Nations World Population
Prospects, 2015 revision. Projections are available in five-year time intervals, which we
linearly interpolate for annual time series. We cap the model life-expectancy at ht = 1
for projected world average life-expectancies exceeding 78 years.
For fertility, the number of children per adult is half the births per women, FRt,
nt = FRt/2.
The historic estimates and projections come from the same UN database.
In contrast to the OLG model, demography in the RCK models only requires a mea-
sure for population size and growth, (Mt,mt), whereMt denotes total population (both
sexes) at period t. Weuse the samemedium-variant projections from theUNdatabase.22
6.2. Preferences calibration
In order to create time series for the discount factor bt, in the calibration of the OLG
model, we determine parameter δ such that bt, as defined in (26), equals the discount
factor b = 0.985 used in Golosov et al. (2014) at 2010. The annualized value ratio asso-
ciated with the year 2010 is then given by b1/30t . Notice that the parameter bt is based on
the life-expectancy at the year 1995. Thus, to calibrate our parameter δ, we set α = 0.3,
life expectancy h2010 = 0.58, output discount factor b2010 = βGHKT = 0.98530 and solve





6.3. Discount factor calculation
Using the above values for the capital share α, preferences δ, life expectancy ht, fertility
nt, we simulate the time series for bt from (26).
22Due to high uncertainty about long-run population prospects, Rozell (2017) recommends to use the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) population projections in climate policy
studies since that dataset implies more reliable demographic scenarios. Our calibration relies on the
United Nations estimations for ease of comparison with previous literature.
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For the RCK model, we apply (35) to calculate the output ratio bt for those models
with logarithmic utility, η = 1. The sequence bt only depends on intergenerational
preferences β and population growth rates mt. For the general model with constant
elasticity of substitution η 6= 1, as in Weitzman (2007); Nordhaus (2008, 2014), we con-










where γt+jt is the compounded productivity growth between period t and t + j. The
historic estimates for productivity growth are based on World Bank data and the SSP
scenarios (see Appendix A for more details). For future projections, we assume a con-
stant annual increase of per capita income of 2 per cent per year. The formula collapses
to (35) for η = 1. We assume stationary population, nt = mt = 1 and constant γt after
2100, and calculate the output ratios (36) backwards, as specified in detail in Appendix
E. We note that, in balanced growth, the output ratio formula becomes b = βγ1−ηmξ. In
appendix C, we show that, indeed, this formula is correct for a balanced growth path.
As a static approximation, we use the formula presented in the introduction to check




Figure 2 depicts the effective annual discount factors, calculated recursively, of our
benchmark model. To relate our approximation to previous analysis, it also displays
the discount factors used in Golosov et al. (2014), which abstracts from demography,
and other RCKmodels with a Benthamite welfare function. Notice that to calculate the
productivity growth factor γt during the period 1970-2015, we use 10-year average of
GDP per capita growth rates to smooth the business cycle features of the data.
The outstanding feature of the figure is the contrasting patterns between our OLG
model and the RCK models with Benthamite welfare. In our model, global demo-
graphic patterns, specially the worldwide rise of life-expectancy, lead to a rise of the
value of future output bt. In contrast, the RCK models show a discount factor that de-
creases over timedue to declining population growth rates. Aswewill see shortly, these
divergent patterns for the discount factor have a significant impact on carbon prices.23
23Notice also that with constant life-expectancy h and nt = 1, our model would match the discount
factor in Golosov et al. (2014).
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1970 1990 2010 2030 2050 2070 2090
year
RCK models Stern (2007)
Golosov et al., (2014) This paper
Note: The year 2017 is indicated with a vertical line. bt is calculated as in equation (26). The parameter
δ is calibrated such that in 2010, the value of b2010 corresponds to 0.985, as in Golosov et al. (2014). The
discount factors for the RCK models are given by (36), see Table 1 for more details and parameter
values.
6.4. Climate dynamics calibration
We use a stylized climate module as in van den Bijgaart et al. (2016) and Gerlagh and
Liski (2017b). The dynamics of damages θi are governed by carbon exchange between
reservoirs, which is conveniently described through an exponential CO2 decay func-
tion. Damages follow temperature, which slowly converges to its equilibrium level for
given atmospheric CO2; a higher atmospheric CO2 content leads to slowly increasing








(1− ηj)i − (1− εk)i
εk − ηj
, (38)
where ηj are the atmospheric depreciation rates, εk are the temperature adjustment
speeds, aj and bk are the shares of the relevant processes, andπ is the long-run emissions-
damages sensitivity. We take the parameters from van den Bijgaart et al. (2016), Table 6
and 7, for themedian carbonmodel, a = (0.220, 0.279, 0.278, 0.222), η = (0, 0.0035, 0.0507, 0.2892),
and temperature models, b = (0.2218, 0.3306, 0.4476), ε = (0.9787, 0.1980, 0.0036), π =
0.0167. These parameters indicate that 22 per cent of emissions remain in the atmo-
sphere ’forever’, while the same share very quickly transits to other carbon reservoirs
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(at about 30% per year). Also, about 22% of temperature adjustment is virtually im-
mediate, while almost half of temperature adjustment only happens after more than a
century.
6.5. The social cost of carbon
We have now everything in place to determine the social costs of carbon. The carbon
price factors gt, as defined by (18), are calculated backwards from 2100 to 2000; the
procedures are described in the Appendices D and E. We multiply the values for gt by
output Yt to quantify the social costs of carbon.
Figure 3 displays the social cost of carbon for the models considered. The implied
carbon price at 2017 based on the model structure of Golosov et al. (2014) is about 25
€/tCO2, growing in-step with the size of the economy. Our model calculates a carbon
price rising faster than the economy, but also at a much higher level, amounting to
about 85 €/tCO2. The RCK models with Benthamite utility, on the other hand, have
carbon prices that grow less than with income, and start at a lower level. Notice that a
worldwide rising carbon price starting at 85 €/tCO2 exceeds by magnitude the objec-
tives stated in the Paris Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs).



















2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
year
RCK models Golosov et al., (2014) This paper
Note: The year 2017 is indicated with a vertical line.
These results suggest that demographic patterns are an important factor in the cal-
culation of the social costs of carbon. As shown in Table 1, the carbon price in our OLG
model at 2100 attains a value of approximately 800 EUR/tC02, a price that is about
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four times higher than the carbon price derived from a model with no demography as
in Golosov et al. (2014).
7. Discussion
In this paper we explore optimal environmental policies in a climate-economy with
population dynamics that entail changes in savings patterns and capital returns. Using
a stylized overlapping generations model, we show that an increase in life-expectancy
and a decrease in fertility rates raise households’ savings, declining the rate of return to
capital due to its relative abundance. Changing savings patterns also lead to changes in
the way people value future economic gains or losses, including climate damages. We
propose a time-varying effective discount factor that allows climate policies to reflect
demographic patterns.
Our results show that demographic factors in climate-economy models have an im-
portant effect on climate policies. We developed a stylized OLG model and Ramsey-
Cass-Koopmans model with life-expectancy and fertility features. For both types of
models we compared one with and one without population dynamics, assuming that
they are calibrated to historic savings. We obtain outstanding divergent patterns for op-
timal carbon prices betweenOLG andRCKmodels. TheOLG andRCKmodelswithout
demography replicate the same carbon price projections. But, when we consider the
expected global demographic trends as in Figure 1, we findmuch higher carbon prices,
that also grow faster than the economy, for the OLGmodel, while we find lower carbon
prices, that also grow below the rate of economic growth, for the RCK models.
Our study thus points to the importance of testing the long-term empirical validity
of integrated assessmentmodels, in terms of the structural connection between demog-
raphy and macro-economic savings and investments, when used for climate policy ad-
vice. The OLG and RCK models, both with rigorous micro-foundation, give radically
different answers, and as our quantitative assessment shows, may lead to an under- or
over-reporting of the social costs of carbon by large amount.
References
Backus, D., Cooley, T., and Henriksen, E. (2014). Demography and low-frequency cap-
ital flows. Journal of International Economics, 92:S90–S102.
28
Balestra, C. and Dottori, D. (2012). Aging society, health and the environment. Journal
of Population Economics, 25:1045–1076.
Barrage, L. (2014). Sensitivity analysis for golosov, hassler, krusell, and tsyvinski (2014):
Optimal taxes on fossil fuel in general equilibrium. Econometrica Supplementary Ma-
terial, 82(1):41–88.
Barrage, L. (2016). Optimal dynamic carbon taxes in a climate-economy model with
distortionary fiscal policy. Working paper.
Becker, G. S. and Lewis, H. G. (1973). On the interaction between the quantity and
quality of children. Journal of political Economy, 81(2, Part 2):S279–S288.
Belfiori, E. (2013). Carbon taxes, altruism and the time consistency of climate policies.
Bloom, D. E., Canning, D., and Graham, B. (2003). Longevity and life-cycle savings. The
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 105(3):319–338.
Bloom, D. E., Canning, D., Mansfield, R. K., and Moore, M. (2007). Demographic pat-
terns and household saving in china. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(1):91–114.
Bohn, H. and Stuart, C. (2015). Calculation of a population externality. American Eco-
nomic Journal: Economic Policy, 7(2):61–87.
Canton, E. and Meijdam, L. (1997). Altruism and the macroeconomic effects of demo-
graphic changes. Journal of Population Economics, 10:317–334.
Carvalho, C., Ferrero, A., and Nechio, F. (2016). Demographics and real interest rates:
Inspecting the mechanism. European Economic Review, 88:208–226.
Casey, G. andGalor, O. (2017). Is faster economic growth compatible with reductions in
carbon emissions? the role of diminished population growth. Environmental Research
Letters, 12.
Chen, K. and Wen, Y. (2017). The great housing boom in china. American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics. forthcoming.
Cipriani, G. P. (2014). Population aging and payg pensions in the olg model. Journal of
Population Economics, 27:251–256.
29
Curtis, C. C., Lugauer, S., andMark, N. C. (2015). Demographic patterns and household
saving in china. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(2):58–94.
Dalton, M., O’Niel, B., Prskawetz, A., Jiang, L., and Pitkin, J. (2008). Population aging
and future carbon emissions in the united states. Energy Economics, 30:642–675.
De la Croix, D. and Gosseries, A. (2012). The natalist bias of pollution control. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management, 63(2):271–287.
Eggertsson, G. B. and Mehrotra, N. R. (2014). A model of secular stagnation. NBER
Working Paper No. 20574.
Fanti, L. and Gori, L. (2012). Fertility and payg pensions in the overlapping generations
model. Journal of Population Economics, 25:955–961.
Fedotenkov, I., van Groezen, B., and Meijdam, L. (2014). Demographic change, inter-
national trade and capital flows. Open Economies Review, 25(5):865–883.
Fenichel, E. P., Kotchen, M. J., and Addicott, E. T. (2017). Even the representative agent
must die: Using demographics to inform long-term social discount rates. NBERWP,
23591.
Gerlagh, R. and Liski, M. (2017a). Carbon prices for the next hundred years. The Eco-
nomic Journal. forthcoming.
Gerlagh, R. and Liski, M. (2017b). Consistent climate policies. Journal of the European
Economic Association. forthcoming.
Gerlagh, R. and van der Zwaan, B. (2001). The effects of ageing and an environmen-
tal trust fund in an overlapping generations model on carbon emission reductions.
Ecological Economics, 36:311–326.
Golosov, M., Hassler, J., Krusell, P., and Tsyvinski, A. (2014). Optimal taxes on fossil
fuel in general equilibrium. Econometrica, 82(1):41–88.
Guo, J., Hepburn, C. J., Tol, R. S., andAnthoff, D. (2006). Discounting and the social cost
of carbon: a closer look at uncertainty. Environmental Science & Policy, 9(3):205–216.
Harford, J. D. (1998). The ultimate externality. The American Economic Review, 88(1):260–
265.
30
Howarth, R. B. (1998). An overlapping generations model of climate-economy interac-
tions. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 100(3):575–591.
Imrohoroglu, A. and Zhao, K. (2017). The chinese saving rate: Long-term care riks,
family insurance and demographics. Working paper.
Iverson, T. and Karp, L. (2017). Carbon taxes and climate commitment with non-
constant time preference.
Jouvet, P.-A., Pestieau, P., and Ponthiere, G. (2010). Longevity and environmental qual-
ity in an olg model. Journal of Economics, 100:191–216.
Karp, L. and Rezai, A. (2014). The political economy of environmental policy with
overlapping generations. International Economic Review, 55(3):711 – 733.
Karp, L. and Traeger, C. (2013). Discounting. In Shogren, J. F., editor, Encyclopedia
of Energy, Natural Resource, and Environmental Economics, volume 2, pages 286–292.
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Krueger, D. and Ludwig, A. (2007). On the consequences of demographic change for
rates of returns to capital and the distribution of wealth and welfare. Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, 54(1):49–87.
Leimbach, M., Kriegler, E., Roming, N., and Schwanitz, J. (2017). Future growth pat-
terns of world regions – a {GDP} scenario approach. Global Environmental Change,
42:215 – 225.
Mariani, F., Pérez-Barahona, A., and Raffin, N. (2010). Life expectancy and the envi-
ronment. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 34:798–815.
Mastrandrea, M. D. and Schneider, S. H. (2001). Integrated assessment of abrupt cli-
matic changes. Climate Policy, 1(4):433–449.
Murtaugh, P. A. and Schlax, M. G. (2009). Reproduction and the carbon legacies of
individuals. Global Environmental Change, 19(1):14–20.
Nordhaus,W. (1993). Rolling the dice: An optimal transition path for controlling green-
house gases. Resource and Energy Economics, 15:27–50.
Nordhaus, W. (2008). A question of balance: weighing the options on global warming policies.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
31
Nordhaus, W. (2014). Estimates of the social cost of carbon: Concepts and results from
the dice-2013r model and alternative approaches. Journal of the Association of Environ-
mental and Resource Economists, 1(1/2):273–312.
Nordhaus,W.D. andYang, Z. (1996). A regional dynamic general-equilibriummodel of
alternative climate-change strategies. The American Economic Review, pages 741–765.
O’Neill, B. C., Kriegler, E., Riahi, K., Ebi, K. L., Hallegatte, S., Carter, T. R., Mathur, R.,
and van Vuuren, D. P. (2014). A new scenario framework for climate change research:
the concept of shared socioeconomic pathways. Climatic Change, 122(3):387–400.
Ono, T. (2005). The political economy of environmental taxes with an aging population.
Environmental & Resource Economics, 30:165–194.
Quaas, M. and Bröcker, J. (2016). Substitutability and the social cost of carbon in a
solvable growth model with irreversible climate change. Working paper.
Rezai, A. and van der Ploeg, F. (2015). Robustness of a simple rule for the social cost of
carbon. Economics Letters, 132:48–55.
Rozell, D. (2017). Using population projections in climate change analysis. Climatic
Change, 142:521–529.
Sánchez-Romero, M. (2013). The role of demography on per capita output growth and
saving rates. Journal of Population Economics, 26(4):1347–1377.
Stern, N. (2007). The economics of climate change: The Stern review. Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambrigde University Press.
van den Bergh, J. and Botzen, W. (2015). Monetary valuation of the social cost of CO2
emissions: A critical survey. Ecological Economics, 114:33–46.
van den Bijgaart, I., Gerlagh, R., and Liski, M. (2016). A simple formula for the social
cost of carbon. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 77:75–94.
Varvarigos, D. (2010). Environmental degradation, longevity, and the dynamics of eco-
nomic development. Environmental & Resource Economics, 46:59–73.
Weitzman, M. L. (2007). A review of the stern review on the economics of climate
change. Journal of Economic Literature, XLV:703–724.
32
Weitzman, M. L. (2013). Tail-hedge discounting and the social cost of carbon. Journal
of Economic Literature, 51(3):873–882.
A. Data and Projections
Theworld GDP per capita data is obtained from ‘World Development Indicators’ of the
World Bank. The GDP per capita at in constant 2010 US$ for 1960 till 2015 is available in
the aforementioned dataset. The projection of this variable beyond historical data and
up to 2100 is done based on a SSP24 scenario. We picked the second scenario, i.e. SSP2,
which assumes moderate challenges in the future of environmental policies. Leimbach
et al. (2017) predict the GDP per capita, under SSP2 scenario, to grow on an average
rate of 2% per year from 2010 till 2100.
B. Proofs
Lemma 1
Proof. We can rewrite the equality in intensive form as
gtLtat(et) = (1− α)a′t(et).
where et = Et/Lt is the emission intensity. The LHS is increasing in et, while the RHS
is decreasing because of concavity. For et = 0, we have that the LHS is less than the
RHS, for et = emaxt we have that the LHS exceeds the RHS (which then equals zero). By
continuity, there must be an et = Et/Lt for which the RHS equals the LHS. 
Proposition 1
Proof. We prove the proposition by induction, starting to establish an allocation and
prices for t = 1, and then continuing for increasing t.
In the first period, the capital stock, K1 is known, labor supply L1 = (1 − χn1) is
inelastic, and the emission price must satisfy p1 = g1Y1. Using the firm’s optimization
on emission, (14), and Lemma 1, we establish a unique level of emissions of the firm
24Shared Socio-economic Pathways are 5 scenarios for the path ahead of the world economy. These
scenarios differ in terms of socioeconomic challenges for mitigation and adaptation activities. The
scenarios are discussed in O’Neill et al. (2014).
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in period one. Therefore, we have pinned down E1, as well as L1 and K1. The wage
rate and the rate of interest in the first period are then determined by (13) and (12). The





and income of the young equals (1− α)Yt. Because of logarithmic utility, a fixed share





The consumption of the old in the first period equals the value of capital
N0h0c2,1 = αYt. (B.2)
It follows immediately from the aggregate goods market equilibrium (20 that the re-
mainder of output is invested. This establishes (25). Finally, (26) follows then from
(12).
Now, assume that the economy is in equilibrium in period t ≥ 1. We can invoke





t=1 βtNt <∞ ensures that welfare and parameters b
t+i
t are well
defined. To prove existence, we first solve the central planner’s problem (24) given tech-
nology, (7, 8, 10), subject to the aggregate goods market clearing condition, (20). We
then show that we can decentralize the optimal allocation as a competitive equilibrium.
The associated Lagrangian for the central planner’s problem reads:




+λt{Yt −Ntc1,t − ht−1Nt−1c2,t −Kt+1}] (B.3)
where λt is the shadow price for the aggregate goods market clearing condition. We
consider the optimal allocation c∗1,t, c∗2,t, Y ∗t , E∗t , K∗t+1 and supporting dual variables λ∗t ,
and show that we can construct prices r∗t , w∗t , p∗t , savings s∗t and transfers τ ∗t such that
all conditions (3-5), (12-14), (15), hold.
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so that FOCs (12-14) are satisifed by construction. The Lagrangean first-order condi-
tions are (for c1,t, c2,t, Kt+1, Et respectively):
βt
c∗1,t
= λ∗t , (B.4)
δβt−1
c∗2,t












The first three FOCs give the households FOC (5). That is, all FOCs the define the
competitive equilibrium are satisfied.
The savings s∗t can subsequently be constructed from r∗t+1 and c∗2,t+1 and (4). The
transfers τ ∗t can subsequently be constructed from r∗t+1 and c∗1,t+1, w∗t , s∗t , and (3). The
regulator’s budget (15) follows fromWalras’ law. Thus, we have shown that the optimal
allocation is a competitive equilibrium. The last two FOCs (B.6, B.7) confirm that the
optimal carbon price equals the market costs of carbon.
We now want to prove the analytical solution for the carbon prices. We guess and








Wewill see that this condition determines specific consumption shares to satisfy (B.4,
B.5). Then, we find the investment shares, and show that this is consistent with (B.6).
Finally, the carbon price rule (B.7) will be shown to produce (27).
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The first two FOCs (B.4, B.5), together with our guess (B.8) imply consumption and






























And indeed, we see that if we substitute (B.8) into the dynamic FOC (B.6), we find
the same expression for the investment share. Thus, the dual variables λ∗t defined by
(B.8) implements the optimal allocation c∗1,t, c∗2,t, Y ∗t , K∗t+1.
To conclude, we immediately see that (B.7) and (B.8) result in the carbon price (27)
mentioned in the proposition. 
Proposition 3
Proof. We first assume that (29) holds, and show that Σ∞t=1Ntβt < ∞. Note that the





Assumption 3 thus guarantees that the sequence βtNt decreases expontentially, and
the infinite sum of a geomteric series is bounded. Therefore, welfare can bemaximized.
Next, we note that for the welfare weights defined by (29), we can invoke Proposition
2 and its proof. The associated Lagrangian and its FOCs are exactly the same as (B.3)
and the respective FOCs in the proof of proposition 2. Combining the first two FOCs









Therefore, the weights must satisfy (29).
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For the carbon price, Proposition 2 tells us thatwe can use (18), inwhichwe substitute
(26) to arrive at (30). 
Corollary 2
Proof. We prove this corollary by induction. For i = 1, we take the derivative for (25)







Note that in a representative economy with gt given, because of Lemma 1, E∗t+1 is inde-












The corollary is thus correct for i = 1. For all future periods i > 1, we use forward















































+ AL(Et+1, Lt+1)](1− χnt+1)Nt > 0.


















































Using (25), a rise in output in t+1 leads to an increase inKt+2 and, therefore, decreases
rt+2. Thereby, the output and the capital stock, as of t + 2, increases as well while the
rates of interest decrease.

Corollary 4










































































and ht is not decreasing in t, the last term in (B.13) is not negative, and as ht∗ < h∞,


















+ λt [Yt − Ct −Kt+1] (B.14)
Following the same procedure as in the proof of proposition 2, and assuming that
there is a unique solution for the competitive equilibrium, the first-order conditions



































Hence, given the feasibility constraint, the investment share is given by (33).
Notice that this expression can be also found by replacing equation (B.18) into equa-
tion (B.16)which validates our guess. Finally, using (B.18) and (B.17), we obtain optimal
carbon prices. 
Corollary 6






















The last part of the corollary follows from the above equation.

Corollary 7
Proof. For i = 1 and ξ = 1, using the expression for the investment share (33) and the






























 > 0 (B.22)
From (7) it follows that dYt+1
dKt+1
> 0, then using the previous result, we can also claim
that dYt+1
dmt
> 0. Using (B.21) we know that dKt+i+1
dYt+i
> 0 and from (7) that dYt+i+1
dKt+i+1
> 0. The
corollary thus holds for all i > 1 as well.

Corollary 8
Proof. For i = 0, notice that from (34-35) we know that if dbt
dmt
> 0, then dpt
dmt
> 0. Apply-
ing the same procedure as before in the proof of corollary 7, it turns out that (35) can







































]2 > 0 (B.24)
This implies that the corollary holds for i = 0. Likewise, we can show that ∂pt
∂mt+i
> 0
for all i > 0.

Corollary 9
Proof. Since the carbon tax-GDP ratio pt
Yt
depends on the discount factor bt and this is a








Therefore, using (B.23) we obtain
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(1 + αx̃t)(1 + αx̃t+1)
> 0
(B.26)
as long as x̃t > x̃t+1 > 0. Since x̃ is a strictly increasing function of mt, if mt > mt+1,
then bt > bt+1, and we get the result.

C. Balanced growth in the RCK Model with CES utility











where Ct denotes consumption, Mt represents total population in this economy, β is
discount factor, ξ is an indicator parameter, and η is the elasticity ofmarginal utility (the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution). The social planner maximizes
(C.1) subject to the same economic constraints as in themain text. Letλt be the Lagrange
multiplier associated to the goods constraint, thus
βtM ξ−1+ηt C
−η
t = λt (C.2)
In balanced growth, population growth m = Mt+1
Mt
is constant, and consumption Ct,













































D. Calculation of gt as in (18)














(1− ηj)i − (1− εk)i
εk − ηj
, (D.3)
and note that these parts satisfy the recursive equation








bt+it (1− ηj)i (D.5)




= 1 + (1− ηj)bt+1xj,t+1,
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Thus, if we assume that demography is in steady state at the final year, t = T , then
bt, xt and gk,t are also stationary from that period onwards, and we can calculate the











The recursive equations are then used to calculate (xt, gt) backwards.
E. Calculation of bt as defined in (36)















































As shown in Appendix C, in balanced growth the last expression collapses to b =
βγ1−ηmξ. But now, we want to solve (E.3) recursively, and we use our auxiliary variable
zt to do so. Assume that population m and productivity γ growth rates are in steady








And we utilize the last equation to calculate (zt, bt) backwards.
45
